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 Open Access and Missing Markets in Artisanal Fishing 
 
1. Introduction 
In many developing countries, both ill-defined property rights and missing markets 
plague renewable resource industries.  Small-scale artisanal fisheries are striking examples as 
open access is frequently present and the remoteness of small fishing communities contributes to 
incomplete labor and product markets.  While over-exploitation is the typical result of open 
access, missing markets have an ambiguous effect that may mitigate or exacerbate open access 
forces.  On the one hand, a missing product market decreases the returns to fishing effort and 
hence reduces aggregate exploitation.  On the other hand, a missing labor market decreases the 
opportunity cost of the time spent fishing. A lower opportunity cost tends to increase exploitation 
because labor is the predominant input in artisanal fishing.  This paper combines an open access 
fisheries model with a simple distance-based missing markets model in order to derive 
implications concerning these two contemporaneous market failures. 
The analytical model incorporates a Schaefer production function for multiple, spatially 
discrete resource stocks, and the model imposes a zero-rent condition to depict open access.  Our 
conceptual framework extends the standard model by introducing distance to market.  Each 
fishing ground lies some distance from a central location at which well-functioning product and 
labor markets exist.  As distance increases, the effective returns to fishing decline because 
fishermen are less able to sell their product at a central market or product quality degrades 
substantially en route.  Increased distance may also decrease the opportunity cost of fishing 
because fishermen are less able to sell their labor for activities outside of their own fishing 
   1enterprises.
1    Equilibrium effort, biomass, and harvest at each fishing location are functions of 
biological parameters, product price, subsistence value, wages in the central market, costs of 
non-labor inputs, and distance.   By imposing open access bioeconomic equilibria, we are able to 
estimate cost and price parameters without simultaneously estimating biological parameters or 
having independent assessments of the fish stocks. 
An econometric model is developed that describes catch per unit effort across multiple 
fish stocks that individually are characterized by open access equilibria with missing markets.  
The model is estimated using data from a cross-sectional household survey of artisanal coral reef 
fishermen in Minahasa, Indonesia.  Each fishing village has a distinct corresponding reef fish 
stock.  The results are used to discuss different policy implications for coral reef conservation 
and extension of transportation infrastructure. 
Most bioeconomic studies in fisheries are conceptual, and empirical work in this area is 
limited (Wilen, 2000). Two studies that empirically model open access fisheries are Wilen 
(1976) and Bjorndal and Conrad (1987), though neither study addresses incomplete labor and 
product markets. Most research, both theoretical and empirical, on missing labor markets in 
developing countries comes from agricultural household production studies (de Janvry, 1991; 
Benjamin, 1992). This literature shows that dropping the efficient labor markets assumption 
leads to substantially different results and hence changes the anticipated effects of policy 
interventions. Previous work that combines renewable resource exploitation with missing 
markets focuses primarily on forest resources (Angelsen, 1999). Most of this literature 
characterizes exploitation of the resource as land-use change from forest cover to agriculture at 
an expanding “open access” frontier (the extensive margin). The lack of a resource stock concept 
                                                 
1 The subsistence value of fishing may ultimately provide a floor for returns to fishing effort.  Similarly, as the 
opportunity cost of fishing labor approaches zero (or some floor leisure value of time), costs of non-labor inputs 
   2and the implied acquisition of property rights prevents these models from being transferred to the 
open access fishery case. An exception in the agro-forestry context is the work by Bluffstone 
(1995) on Nepali agriculturalists who exploit a forest commons for fuel and fodder. He conducts 
a dynamic simulation of a representative village model under varying labor market conditions. 
Blusffstone concludes that the availability of an off-farm labor market, even at low wages, 
stabilizes and possibly constrains exploitation, counteracting open access’s tendency to 
overexploit. Our model treats distance as a market failure where transaction costs create a wedge 
between prices at the center and the periphery. Contributions by Chomitz and Gray (1996), 
Omamo (1998), and Jacoby (2000), again in the developing country, agricultural context, show 
that infrastructure, in particular roads, generate benefits for the rural households and influence 
their labor allocation decisions. Chomitz and Gray further shows that roads can facilitate 
deforestation.  Do we expect transportation infrastructure to affect open access fisheries in a 
similar manner? 
Our theoretical model suggests that more remote areas will exploit fish stocks more 
heavily if the distance elasticity of price exceeds the distance elasticity of cost. Since these 
elasticities are negative, this means that fishing effort increases with distance if the opportunity 
cost of fishing effort decays more rapidly over space than the product price.  The empirical 
results, though preliminary, support the notion that product and labor market effects operate in 
different directions on overall fishing exploitation. 
The next section outlines the conceptual model and derives the basic implications of an 
open access equilibrium with missing labor and product markets.  Section 3 describes the 
empirical setting and data collection in Minahasa, Indonesia, while section 4 specifies and 
                                                                                                                                                             
provide a floor for the marginal cost of fishing effort. 
   3estimates an empirical model of artisanal fisher catch per unit effort.  Section 5 briefly discusses 
the results and policy implications. 
2. A Simple Conceptual Model 
 
To study the effects of distance in an open access setting, we modify the static open 
access framework of Gordon (1954).  We assume that individual fishers are price-takers, and 
price (p) is a function of distance to market (τ).  We further assume that costs are linear in fishing 
effort and that marginal cost (c) is a function of distance as well.  As distance increases, the 
fisher’s price decreases because either product quality degrades en route to market, or the fisher 
must sell to a broker who takes a portion of the wholesale price in the fish market.  Further, 
increased remoteness of a fishing village tends to decrease opportunities to work outside of 
fishing.  As such, the opportunity cost of an individual’s fishing effort (E) is decreasing in 
distance.  Thus, we assume p’(τ) < 0 and c’(τ) < 0.  Now suppose that the fish stock (x) in each 
location evolves according to the following: 
() h x F x − = & ,            ( 1 )  
where F(x) is net growth and h is harvest.  We assume a Schaefer production function such that 
harvest is proportional to the product of effort and stock size: 
  ,            ( 2 )   qEx h =
where q is a catchability coefficient.   
An open access steady state exists when fishing rents are zero, and  .  Thus, 
the following two equations combined with (2) characterize an open access steady state with 
distance-induced missing labor and product markets: 
0 = = = E h x & & &
() h x F = ,            ( 3 )  
() () 0 = − E c h p τ τ .           ( 4 )  
   4By rearranging (2), substituting for x in (3), rearranging (4), and substituting for h in (3), we 
have: 
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To find the net effect of distance (or remoteness) on fishing effort in an open access equilibrium, 
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is always negative.  To see this, multiply both terms by qx/x and recognize 
the qEx is h, which in equilibrium is F(x).  Hence, the term is positive whenever F’(x) < F(x)/x, 
or the marginal is below the average.  This is always true for concave functions.
2  Violations of 
this condition would occur if there were biological depensation.  Assuming concave net growth, 
effort increases with distance whenever: 
  ()() ()() 0 ' ' < − τ τ τ τ c p p c .          ( 7 )  
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Effort increases in distance when the distance elasticity of cost is less than the distance elasticity 
of price.  Since both elasticities are negative, this implies that effort increases when the 
magnitude of the cost elasticity of distance is greater.  In other words, exploitation goes up in 
villages further away from product and labor markets if the opportunity cost of fisher time 
   5decays more rapidly over space than the product price.  Although this basic result is not 
surprising, it provides motivation for empirically analyzing the effects of remoteness on the 
resource stock through the pathways of  price and opportunity cost of fishing. 
 
3. Empirical Setting and Data 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Our area of study is the Minahasa region of Indonesia, which is located on the northern 
tip of the island of Sulawesi. This tropical region exhibits an abundance of terrestrial and marine 
biodiversity. Agriculture is the major economic activity, with cloves and coconuts being the 
major cash crops. The fertility of the land and some mineral resources generate significant 
wealth by developing country standards. The population of the Minahasa region was close to one 
and a quarter million in 1999 (BPS, 2002), living either in rural settings or in one of two truly 
urban areas (Manado and Bitung). Located on a thin peninsula, the region has over 350 km of 
coast line, much of it supporting coral reefs. 
In coastal villages fishing is a significant activity. Mostly small-scale artisanal fishermen 
and their families depend on the coastal marine environment for their livelihood. These 
fishermen employ wooden boats and canoes, 3 to 6 meters long, usually propelled by paddle and 
sometimes by low horsepower outboard motors. Their gear consist predominantly of hook and 
line, small nets, spears and homemade spear guns. They go on daily fishing trips lasting between 
4 and 12 hours, sometimes accompanied by a family member. Their catch, seldom exceeding 50 
kilograms per day, is caught in the proximity of the reefs and consists to a large degree of reef 
fish. A portion of the catch is consumed by the households themselves and the rest is sold either 
to traders or directly to consumers in surrounding villages (often with the wife taking the roll of a 
trader) (Kramer et al., 2002). The limited range of the artisanal fishermen and the fact that most 
 
2 The authors thank Jim Wilen for helping to clarify this interpretation. 
   6coral reef fish are stationary at the kilometer scale (at least in their non-larval stage), sanction the 
assumption of a discrete and independent resource stock at each village location.
3 
The artisanal fishermen supply the local markets and participate, through traders, in more 
distant, larger fish markets (inland and fish processing). The traders operate both by land and sea. 
An asphalt road network connects the bigger population centers. Smaller roads that connect 
villages  to population centers are not always asphalt and are often poorly maintained. Tropical 
climate and mountainous terrain (up to 2 000 meters) makes these roads difficult and sometimes 
impassable. Some coastal villages do not have any road access. By sea, traders move fish to 
coastal towns with good road connections or directly to the urban areas for processing. In the 
smaller villages the only alternative work activity to fishing is farming, while in the larger towns 
and urban areas other forms of employment are available to varying degrees. The cities of 
Manado(the capital of the North Sulawesi province) and Bitung are, besides national air and sea 
transportation hubs, industrial processing centers of the region’s agricultural and natural 
resources and are supporting a growing tourism industry. 
This paper draws on an earlier study of marine fishermen and migration in Minahasa, 
Indonesia (Kramer et al., 2002).
4 Interviews with stakeholders and experts at the local university 
and local NGOs over the last three years, a household survey  and a survey to gather village-level 
data (interviews with village leaders) have led to the construction of an extensive data set. As 
part of the household survey, 600 households in the district of Minahasa and the urban areas of 
Manado and Bitung, whose primary occupation was fishing, were interviewed. Two focus 
groups with fishermen and a pretest served to develop and test the household survey instrument. 
                                                 
3 Unlike the Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) model, our system is “closed” both in economic and in biological terms.  
Fish stock linkages enter only indirectly through labor and product market connections but, by assumption, not 
through spatially explicit rents. 
4 This research was funded in part by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. 
   7After a sampling frame was created by visiting most coastal villages (to collect fisher population 
data, not individual names), multi-stage random sampling was used to select five sub-districts 
and then 17 coastal villages within them. Finally, on location, the interviewers created a list of 
fishing households and sampled according to a preset routine. The survey was implemented in 
July 1999 with the help of recent graduates from the local university, who, after 3 days of 
training, served as our interviewers. 
Descriptive statistics for the villages in our sample are presented in Table 1. The Table 
serves to illustrate the large variation among different dimensions among the 17 villages. Village 
populations range from 535 to 7115 individuals. At the upper end of this scale, villages represent 
jurisdictional units within larger urban areas, making it likely that the numbers are 
underestimates of the size of the effective economic units (markets) that are of primary interest 
to us. Over the preceding decade population growth averaged 2% which corresponds 
approximately to secondary estimates for the region (BPS, 2002 ). Large variation at the village 
level is probably due to both inaccurate population counts and to significant in- and out-
migration. The shortest distance from the villages to large population centers with easy access to 
fish markets is on average 11.8 km. For 6 villages this distance reflects transportation by sea.
5 
Ethnic diversity, expressed by religion, and variation in the economic specialization of each 
village is also apparent. 
                                                 
5 These include three villages on islands off the coast of Sulawesi (5-16km), one village with no road connection, 
and two villages with roads of such quality that most transportation is done by sea. 
   8 
Table 1: Characteristics of the surveyed villages (n=17) 




Population size  2518 3837 535  7115
Population growth rate  2% 2% -5%  8%
Distance to market (km)  11.8 6.3 0  40
Muslim households  38% 49% 0%  95%
Fishing households  44% 48% 10%  95%
Number of fishing households  242 378 32  566
Catch per unit effort
1 2.9 2.6 0.8  11.8
1 Catch per unit effort represents the village average kilogram of fish per hour of time spend fishing by an 
artisanal fisherman with a 3 to 6 meter canoe with up to one extra crew member. This attempts to correct for 
different fishing types, i.e. capital investment, and is hence based on a sub-sample of our respondents. 
 
 
The final entry shown in Table 1 is the village-level catch per unit of effort (in kilograms 
per hour). The average is 2.9 kg/hour, yet, amazingly, it varies by over a factor of 10 among the 
villages. While some of this variation will be due to omitted and unobservable differences in 
effort (such as differences in boat propulsion and fisherman skill, respectively), the magnitude 
begs for a more systematic explanation. The scant laws applying to coastal resources (originating 
from the federal level in Jakarta) are not communicated to the local level, much less enforced. 
Furthermore, more localized rule systems for allocating access to marine resources are not 
common in the study area. As a result, efficient resource management cannot serve to explain 
effort variation and the assumption of an open access property rights situation is justified. We 
argue that the economic forces that would bring about an open access spatial equilibrium are 
present, since substantial inter-village migration occurred in the 50 years prior to our sample 
   9period.  Of the survey respondents, over 50% were born outside the village they live in and 25% 
were born outside the Minahasa region altogether (Kramer et al., 2002).
6  
 
4. The Empirical Model and Estimation 
 
  To estimate a model of open access in multiple artisanal fishing communities, we posit 
that the zero-rent condition applies to individual fishermen (i): 
() () i E z c h x p i i i i ∀ = − , 0 ,          ( 9 )  
where xi and zi can contain individual-specific determinants of product price and opportunity 
cost of fishing effort respectively.  In our regression the regressor xi will vary only at the village 
level (implying that the village fish price is independent of the individual). The regressor zi will 










= .            ( 1 0 )  
In words, the individual fisher’s catch per unit effort (CPUE) in open access is the individual’s 
cost/price ratio. We use kilograms of catch per hour of human labor for CPUE. High levels of 
catch per unit effort correspond to low levels of aggregate effort given standard assumptions 
about stock dynamics. According to the theoretical development earlier in the paper, the varying 
levels of open access equilibria are driven by differences in the prevailing prices and opportunity 
costs for the fishery participants at each location.  Prices depend on access to the product market 
and would thus hinge on geographical location.  However, opportunity cost depends both on 
geographical location and individual fisher heterogeneity.
7 In essence, a fisher’s choice of 
                                                 
6 We assume that each location is well characterized by an open access steady state, recognizing that we do not have 
sufficient data to test the equilibria against approach paths. 
7 In the regression below, we account for heterogeneity in observable differences across individuals in the sample.  
We treat unobserved heterogeneity as random noise without any additional structure.  In future work, we plan to 
explore group-wise heteroskedasticity at the village level. 
   10equilibrium fishing effort is based on the individual’s shadow wage.  We do not directly observe 
individual prices and costs, but we do observe factors that influence them. Following our theory, 
we posit that distance from market is the primary determinant of price and opportunity cost.  
Suppose that the cost and price functions of distance are Cobb-Douglass and assume a 
multiplicative error.  Taking natural logs, we have the following estimation equation: 




ik k o i z x CPUE ε γ β β + − + = ∑ ∑ ln ln l n ,       ( 1 1 )  
where k indexes cost factors, j indexes price factors, β0 is the log-ratio of cost and price scaling 
coefficients, and ε is a random disturbance. 
Abstract distance to market is not necessarily the same scale in physical distance for cost 
and price factors.  In order to separately account for each, proxies are chosen that correlate well 
with one market and not the other. The variables that will serve as proxies in the regression for 
the price and cost gradients over space are the following: distance to major market in kilometers; 
a dummy variable to represent that sea transportation is the predominant form for villages on 
islands or without adequate roads; the village population size in multiples of 1000 individuals; 
and, at the household level, a dummy variable to signify the ownership of land and a variable for 
the education of the fisherman.
8 
How do these variables correlate with the labor market and (shadow) wages? While an 
average distance of 12 km to major market might not seem great, one must look at distance in 
relation to the transportation infrastructure. In a tropical developing country it is unlikely that 
individuals will commute large distances in the absence of private or reliable public 
                                                 
8 For each respondent the education level takes a value between 1 and 5, where 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 represent completion 
of No Schooling, Primary, Secondary, High School and some University, respectively. 
   11transportation.
9 In the absence of significant commuting beyond a village, both distance to major 
market and the lack of adequate road connections are unlikely to influence a village resident’s 
employment opportunities because there is no trade in labor beyond the village. The village size 
on the other hand is likely to be a significant proxy for work opportunities beyond fishing, as 
specialization and labor dependence are correlated with urbanization. Ownership of land and 
education should raise the opportunity costs of time of an individual, since he or she has the 
option to farm and more jobs from which to choose. 
How do the above variables correlate with the product market (prices) and the return to 
fishing? Unlike in the case of labor, distance to major market and the lack of adequate road 
connections, i.e. transport by sea, will be less of a barrier to trade in fish. Yet both measures 
should significantly affect the price a fisherman receives for his catch since traders and 
middlemen will require a mark-up to cover their costs.
10 Again, distance needs to be interpreted 
in light of a developing country’s infrastructure. In the absence of refrigeration or ice even short 
distances can create situations prohibitive to trade in fresh fish.
11 More importantly, the logistics 
of coordinating fishing with appropriate and timely delivery to market impose a significant cost 
on distance. The next variable, the village population size, determines the local market available 
to the fishers. An argument that implies a lesser role for the impact of the village size on the 
product market (with respect to its impact on the labor market) is the following. When fish is 
traded beyond the local market, it implies that local demand is satisfied at the major market fish 
                                                 
9 This clearly ignores temporary migration to find work. Home ownership is very high among our respondents and 
practically none owned motorized transportation. Both facts tentatively argue for less mobility among household 
members. 
10 For example, based on a price survey in three of the seventeen villages, the price level, expressed as a percentage 
of the retail price in an urban market, is approximately 90% in major markets and 55% for more remote villages on 
the coast of Sulawesi. Sea transportation from the islands and roadless villages will, almost surely, reduce the price 
level further. 
11 Dried and/or salted fish is an obvious response, which lowers the value of the product, i.e. the return to the 
fishermen. 
   12price minus transaction cost, i.e. transportation and marketing. Empirically, the rural prices are a 
fraction of the major market prices, and villages do not import fish from major markets.  
Moreover, we expect that marginal prices will determine marginal exploitation. Thus, price of 
fish sold outside the village determines marginal exploitation, and  village population size, 
especially for smaller ones, is unlikely to affect the fish price. Finally, it is fairly implausible that 
land ownership by- or education of- an individual will affect the fish price he or she receives for 
her catch. 
By separately accounting for labor market distance and product market distance, we hope 
to test the distance decay assumptions of our conceptual model and to identify the offsetting 
effects.  This leads to the following hyphotheses.  Distance to a product market increases the 
open access equilibrium catch per unit effort.
12 A larger local labor market, owning private land, 
and greater human capital also increase open access catch per unit effort. 
We use Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the three regressions that we report. They 
differ from one another only with respect to the particular rule used to include observations. 
There are two reasons for this approach. First, the household survey identified two somewhat 
overlapping categories of fishermen in Minahasa. The first group, small-scale artisanal fishermen 
who rely on the near-shore coastal resources (in particularly the coral reef), are the focus of this 
paper. The second group consists of fishermen (both owners and crews) engaged in large-scale 
motorized fishing operations that target off-shore pelagic fish stocks. While the majority of 
observations clearly fall into one or the other of these categories, the full sample does contain 
observations that are not clear cut, requiring a subjective judgment. The second reason, related to 
the first, is that a major determinant of catch per unit effort is the technology employed. Since we 
do not include technology variables as regressors, differences among fishermen will increase the 
   13unexplained variation in the regression. To address both concerns, the three regression impose 
differing restrictions on which households qualify as engaged in artisanal fishing, i.e. who 
exploit the village associated near-shore resource. Model I is the most inclusive, requiring only 
that the average catch per fishing trip be less than 100kg. Model II restricts the number of 
observations further by lowering this threshold to 50kg. Finally, model III adds restrictions on 
the fishing technology that qualifies as artisanal. Here, artisanal fishermen must fish entirely 
alone from a non-motorized, non-sail canoe of which they are the owners. 
The regression results are shown in Table 2. The adjusted R
2 ranges from 0.077 to 0.140, 
increasing with additional sampling restrictions as would be expected. The F tests (joint 
hypotheses that all slope coefficients are zero) are 5.81, 6.73, and 5.38, all highly significant. 
Distance to major market is significant at the 1% (I and II) and 5% (III) level, while the 
island/sea-access-only dummy is significant at the 5% (I and II) and 10% (III) level. Both have a 
positive sign, which is consistent with their interpretation as proxies for the fish product market. 
Longer distances to market and transportation routes by sea, both of which correlate with number 
of middle men and transaction costs, raisethe catch per unit effort in an open access equlibrium. 
Given standard assumptions about fish biology and fishing technology this implies a larger stock 
size and hence a less exploited resource. 
The village population size is consistently positive and significant at the 1% level. A 
positive sign is consistent with its interpretation as a proxy for a labor market. Alternative 
employment opportunities will raise the opportunity costs of time for everyone in the particular 
location, such, that they require higher returns to fishing. Given the open access equilibrium 
assumption, villages with larger populations will hence exhibit higher catch per unit effort 
values. Again, given the standard assumptions, this implies a larger stock size and a less 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 We assume concavity of the stock growth function. 
   14exploited resource. Land ownership and education are both positive and, in all but one case, 
significant at the 5% level or better. Both are proxies for labor market possibilities and 
opportunity costs of time specific to an individual. These results reinforce the above in that 
higher opportunity costs imply higher equilibrium CPUEs and thus relatively less stock 
exploitation. 
 
Table 2: Catch per unit effort regression 
(dependant variable: natural log of kilograms per hour) 
I. II.  III. 
Constant  -0.67** -1.18*** -1.52*** 
-(2.22) -(3.97) -(4.09) 
Distance to market (km)  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 
(2.87) (2.97) (1.98) 
Island or sea access dummy  0.45** 0.48**  0.4* 
(2.46) (2.56) (1.82) 
Village population (1000)  0.18*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
(3.73) (4.53) (3.54) 
Owns land dummy  0.45*** 0.38** 0.47** 
(2.67) (2.30) (2.32) 
Education
1  0.09 0.2**  0.32*** 
(0.96) (2.19) (2.72) 
Number of observations  353 312 171 
Adjusted R
2  0.077 0.099 0.140 
Average kg/hour
  3.33 2.63 2.18 
Note:    t-statistic in (…), * significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 
level. 
 
In summary, these regressions tentatively indicate that both cost and price gradients (with 
respect to distance) are active and relevant in determining the stock level and associated resource 
health of coastal fisheries in Minahasa, Indonesia. Socio-economic variables that might be 
   15proxies for a subsistence requirement as a lower bound to the price gradient, such as household 
size or number of children, did not have any significance attached to them and were dropped 
from the regression. Given the wealth status of the fishermen in the sample it is not surprising 





Inadequately defined property rights and missing labor and product markets create 
significant resource allocation problems in many tropical, coastal communities. This paper has 
attempted to provide a systematic examination of how these two sources of market failure may 
reinforce or offset each other.  Our conceptual framework, based on a Schaefer production 
function for multiple, spatially discrete resource stocks, allows us to combine an open access 
fisheries model with a simple distance-based missing markets model. The analytical results show 
that in a stylized world, fishing effort increases in distance from product and labor if the 
opportunity cost of fishermen’s time decays more rapidly over space than does the product price.   
We have presented a simple econometric model to examine variation in catch per unit of 
effort across multiple, open access fish stocks.  The model is estimated using data from a  
household survey of artisanal coral reef fishermen living in coastal villages in eastern Indonesia.  
The preliminary empirical results support the notion that product and labor market effects 
operate in different directions on overall fishing exploitation.  Although they are preliminary, 
these results suggest that development efforts may have perverse effects on the resource base.  
However, our current empirical specification does not allow us to assess fully the relative 
distance elasticities of cost and price. 
   16In the non-standard case of biological depensation, the conceptual model indicates that 
the comparative static results switch signs.  That is, increased remoteness increases fishing effort 
if price decays with distance more rapidly than opportunity cost.   With critical depensation, 
extending market infrastructure without addressing the fundamental lack of property rights to the 
resource could easily produce stock collapses under certain circumstances.  As such, a full 
assessment of the impacts of infrastructure development on the resource base ultimately requires 
a better understanding of the population dynamics of the exploited species.  In related work, we 
are exploring independent assessments of reef quality and how they can be used as indicators of 
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